

Study project on "The importance of Financial Intermediaries in SME financing and assessment of different economic effects especially of UE Financial Instruments in light of direct guarantee vs. counter-guarantee contracts"

European Association of Guarantee Institutions

Board of Directors, Paris

Index

- 1 Context
- Comparison of the efficiency of different types of guarantee models
- "Direct guarantees" vs "Counter-guarantees": potential effects of Direct guarantees on the market and on Guarantee Institutions
- 4 Policy recommendations





Context

Context

The importance of SMEs' access to credit



SMEs' access to credit enables economic growth

■ The importance of ensuring SMEs access to credit is widely recognised as the **key** instrument to boost economic growth, especially in Europe, where SMEs represent the majority of businesses



Access to credit is a "public good"

- Therefore, access to credit can be considered as a "public good" because of its social and economic function
- Rationale for public intervention



Context

The importance of a Guarantee system

■ SMEs are typically at a disadvantage with respect to large firms when accessing finance, owing to opacity, information asymmetry, under-collateralisation, high transaction costs and lack of financial skills

Market failure

■ The financial crisis contributed to widening the financing gap, generating a market failure, where supply of credit (particularly for SMEs and entrepreneurs) has not been able to meet an increasing demand



- SME financing remains high on the political agenda in most areas of the world and **credit** guarantees remain the most widely used instrument to ease access to finance for SME
- Credit guarantee schemes alleviate the market failure and stimulate investment and social and economic growth




■ An increase in investments generated by an increase in guarantees, calculated in line with historical market trends, might have a relevant impact on a country's GDP and on the labour market

Impacts on GDP



Impacts on labour market







Comparison of the efficiency of different types of guarantee models


Comparison of the efficiency of different types of guarantee models Advantages of Guarantee Institutions and Counter-guarantees

■ There are many advantages both for banks and Guarantee Institutions deriving from Counter-guarantee activities

Added Value generated by Guarantee Institutions

There is wide agreement (both in empirical studies and in the literature) that three advantages are brought by Guarantee Institutions, which can:

- reduce informational asymmetries between agents
- limit "adverse selection" (for high-risk borrowers) and "moral hazard" (for existing borrowers) mechanisms
- fill the financing gap, working as wealth-pooling mechanism





Comparison of the efficiency of different types of guarantee models Constants and variables: how does an efficient guarantee system look like?

By analysing the different Guarantee models adopted across Europe a few "constants" and "variables" can be isolated, where constants represent common factors to most guarantee models, whereas variables are distinctive characteristics which define the peculiarities of different guarantee schemes and systems

Constants

Public support

- national support (e.g. the Italian guarantee fund "Fondo di Garanzia") and supra-national support (e.g. EIB Group)
- 2 Increase in the volume of guarantees
 - increasing volume of guarantees over the years, also related to the increase in the volume and number of Direct Guarantees
- "Market-friendly" instruments and players
 - market-friendly mechanisms to distribute public funding, because of the "nature" of Guarantee Institutions
- Financial and economic additionality
 - credit access to "disadvantaged SMEs" and positive effects on the economy as a whole

Variables

- Pricing structure
 - different types of fees and percentage of the loan which is guaranteed
- Operational aspects
 - "go-to-market" strategies and distribution model
 - involved players, ownership, legal form and source of funding
- Guarantee institutions' closeness to local economic environment
 - network activities, operational catchment, geographical and sectoral coverage
- Extent of additionality and impacts
 - extent of the financial and economic additionality created, embedded into the Guarantee system architecture



Comparison of the efficiency of different types of guarantee models Key changes in the Guarantee system

■ The following are the most striking changes occurred in the last few decades which might have/have had an impact on the Guarantee system, therefore on the activity of Guarantee Institutions





Greater availability of European Funds

- Greater availability of European Funds promoting access to credit.
- Indeed, the European Investment Bank Group responded rapidly to the financial crisis with an anticyclical response in banking and capital markets, including those for SMEs

Direct Guarantee

- More recently, a clear tendency has been witnessed in making EU financing instruments available directly to commercial banks
- The EU (especially through the European Investment Fund (EIF)) can now issue guarantee contracts directly to commercial banks (the so-called "Direct Guarantee"); or, alternatively, can issue guarantee contracts with a Guarantee Institution (the so-called "Counterguarantee")

Which is the impact that Direct Guarantees are having (or will be likely to have in the near future) on the activity of Guarantee Institutions, the market, and ultimately on SMEs and the economic environment?



Opportunity: Public intervention to fill the gap




Risk: Potentially, inefficient allocation of public funding





"Direct guarantees" vs "counter-guarantees"

"Direct guarantees" vs "counter-guarantees" Impacts of direct guarantees



Perceived competition

Perception of uncertainty and misalignment of incentives; indeed the EU direct guarantees rather than being perceived as sponsors, or in other words, as deploying public money through instruments that can re-distribute it, are currently treated as an additional player within the market, hence causing "unfair" competition

Deadweight effect

When the guarantee is free (i.e. no fees are requested to the bank) or quasi-free (i.e. fees are very low), the deadweight effect can appear when the bank takes a guarantee on the loan which it could have accepted even without the guarantee

Self-selection effect

Strictly linked to the deadweight effect, there is the "rich-get-richer and poor-get-poorer" behaviour from a SME perspective. If the EU signs a contract directly with a commercial bank to issue guarantees, the commercial bank will likely to grant the loan to firms already having a relationships with the bank

Leverage effect

Empirical evidence shows that the so-called "leverage effect" (or "additionality") generated by counter-guarantees is much higher than the leverage generated by direct guarantees

Inefficient allocation of public money

As a consequence of the impacts briefly described above, it might well be that public funding to enhance firms' global competitiveness and economic growth is allocated inefficiently



© 2016 KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International. KPMI International provides no services to clients. No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis-à-vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm. All rights reserved.

"Direct guarantees" vs "counter-guarantees" Distortionary effect: Deadweight effect

• One of the key impacts is the so-called "deadweight effect", according to which particularly favourable conditions applied by the EU to commercial banks when issuing funding for direct guarantees (e.g. the cost of the guarantee itself) are providing an incentive for banks to use the guarantee even

when unnecessary

Driver (iii

Impacts




Reasons

Case studies

Number and volume of guarantees issued by Guarantee Institutions



 Reduction in the number and volume of guarantees issued by Guarantee Institutions in favour of the banks which signed a direct guarantee contract directly with the EU Since the EIF Direct Guarantee is free (i.e. no fees are requested to the bank) or quasifree (i.e. fees are very low) the banks tend to use mainly this form of guarantee rather than the guarantee of Guarantee Institutions



Quality of credit for Guarantee Institutions







■ The outstanding guarantees which continue to be issued to those commercial banks tend to belong to a higher risk rating class

■ Since the EIF guarantees for 50% only and the guarantees issued by Guarantee Institutions cover generally up to 80%, it is very likely that commercial banks ask for a guarantee from the EIF for relatively less risky cases in order to lower their own risk; and they would, for those cases with a relatively higher risk, opt for the guarantee provided by the Guarantee Institutions meaning that the bank's own risk would amount to 20% only



A few Countries have so far had direct experience of those indirect effects

Note 1: Reduction since the beginning of 2015, when was implemented the SME Initiative Progam

Note 2: Reduction with respect to the previous guarantee program, when the agreement between the bank and EIF was not in use yet

Note 3: Reduction since the end of 2013, when the bank started to benefit form the direct guarantee provided by EIF



"Direct guarantees" vs "counter-guarantees" Distortionary effect: Leverage effect (1/2)


Leverage effect

- The leverage effect is a multiplier effect generated within the guarantee system
- Guarantee institutions can grant more than they actually have, because they have to pay for the actual amount granted to SMEs if and only if SMEs do not pay their debts back to financing banks
- The leverage is calculated as the ratio between the outstanding loans guaranteed commitments to the underlying own funds of the guarantee scheme
- A higher leverage effect, if managed properly, could generate a higher financial and economic additionality

Empirical evidence shows that the so-called "leverage effect" (or "additionality") generated by Counter-Guarantees is much higher than the leverage generated by Direct Guarantees, thanks to the presence of an additional player: the Guarantee Institutions

Direct Guarantee

- The value chain of Direct Guarantees is the result of the guarantee activity of one single player, namely the bank, taking advantage of a single guarantee instrument, namely the EU scheme
- As such, SMEs guarantees can be a source of funding or regulatory capital relief, which in turn generates leverage effect into the economy, thanks to the investments that SMEs can make, generating economic value into the local and national economy



Counterguarantee


- The value chain of Counter-Guarantees implies that an additional player, the Guarantee Institutions (G.I), take a role guaranteeing for the SMEs on the loan they take with the commercial bank
- Indeed, the value chain of Counter-Guarantees implies that both players can benefit from funding or capital relief: leverage is generated both from the bank and the guarantors; together with the "catalytic effect" born by SMEs investments into the economy






"Direct guarantees" vs "counter-guarantees" Distortionary effect: Leverage effect (2/2)

Case studies: What is the leverage of 1€ invested?





"Direct guarantees" vs "counter-guarantees" Distortionary effect: Inefficient allocation of public money



Inefficient allocation of public money

- Failure to ensure financial and economic additionality to the target SMEs population (i.e. public support reaches viable enterprises which would not otherwise had access to finance or would have accessed finance at tighter conditions, and lower impact on the economy as a whole)
- Inability to catalyse and leverage the provision of **private resources**, especially in risk capital markets
- The inefficient allocation of public money can only be challenged by **measuring and monitoring the public policies and investments' impact** on the local economy as a whole over the years





Policy recommendations

Policy recommendations Policy recommendations

■ In light of the evidence gathered, a few recommendations to relevant stakeholders can be summarised as follow



Complementarities and synergies: Greater complementarities and synergies between existing instruments and players, at all levels, national and supranational



Distinction between sponsors and players: Clear distinction between sponsors and players within the guarantee market, by recognising Guarantee Institutions as main players generating financial and economic additionality, supported by EU institutions as main sponsor of the activity of Guarantee Institutions



Efficient use of public money: Increased efficiency in the use of public money, achievable through a greater deployment of public money channelled through Counter-guarantees, generating greater leverage effect on the market and on the wider economy



Data availability: Increase in data availability for systematic measurement of efficiency in the deployment of public money, allowing to measure market performance and efficiency





kpmg.com/socialmedia















© 2016 KPMG International Cooperative ("KPMG International"), a Swiss entity. Member firms of the KPMG network of independent firms are affiliated with KPMG International. KPMG International provides no services to clients. No member firm has any authority to obligate or bind KPMG International or any other member firm vis-à-vis third parties, nor does KPMG International have any such authority to obligate or bind any member firm. All rights reserved.

The information contained herein is of a general nature and is not intended to address the circumstances of any particular individual or entity. Although we endeavor to provide accurate and timely information, there can be no guarantee that such information is accurate as of the date it is received or that it will continue to be accurate in the future. No one should act on such information without appropriate professional advice after a thorough examination of the particular situation.